In 2011, Kenya embarked on an ambitious military intervention in Somalia in response to a series of deadly attacks and kidnappings carried out by the extremist group al-Shabab.
The primary objective of the operation was to establish a buffer zone that would effectively counter cross-border assaults and protect Kenya’s national security interests. However, after 13 years later, it has become increasingly evident that the Kenyan military operation in Somalia fell short of the country’s initial expectations.
Upon the deployment of the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), there have been widespread optimism that the mission would help contain the security threats from the al-Qaeda linked militant group based in neighbouring Somalia.
The initial phase of the operation dubbed ‘Operation Linda Nchi (Operation Protect the Country) has made significant progress, with key towns, including Kismayo, successfully captured from al-Shabab.
However, as the dust settled, Kenya faced the arduous task of establishing a secure buffer zone to achieve its primary objective.
In pursuit of this goal, Kenya forged an alliance with Ahmed Mohamed Islam, known as Madobe, identifying him as a key figure who could aid in the realization of their security objectives. As a result, Madobe was installed as the President of Jubaland.
However, much to Kenya’s disappointment, after 13 years, Madobe’s administration has proven ineffective in advancing their objectives, with his administration has been unable to extend it’s authority beyond the confines of Kismayo, the interim administrative capital of Jubaland lest for support, thereby impeding Kenya’s broader strategy for establishing a more expansive security framework.
THE UNDERLYING COMPLEXITIES
Madobe’s lengthy tenure in Jubaland has been marred by allegations of prioritizing power consolidation and divisive politics, neglecting vital security objectives, particularly the puster of al-Shabab from the region.
Critics argue that instead of focusing on the pressing security issue, Madobe has maintained oppressive rule, resulting in the exodus of numerous politicians and a significant portion of Jubaland residents, driven by arbitrary arrests, intimidation and even murders. These actions have further deepened existing divisions among the region’s communities.
Having held office for over a decade, Madobe has long been accused of leveraging Kenya’s support to manipulate regional elections. This strategic maneuver has allowed him to remain in power, outlasting four former presidents of Somalia with whom he engaged in constant contests. As a result, he has effectively established his state as an independent entity, operating beyond the authority of the central government, undermining state-building efforts in the country.
The Jubaland opposition groups argue that Madobe’s focus on consolidating his power and employing divisive tactics has come at the expense of crucial security objectives. The failure to effectively combat al-Shabab’s presence in Jubaland has left the region vulnerable to persistent violence and instability. While neighbouring regions have made significant progress in countering the terrorist group, Jubaland’s security situation remains precarious.
Under his leadership, oppressive rule has led to widespread discontent and disillusionment among politicians and residents alike. Many have chosen to flee the region, fearing arbitrary arrests and facing an intimidating climate. The alarming number of murders has intensified the prevailing sense of insecurity, further deepening divisions among Jubaland’s communities.
The continued failure of the long-serving regional leader has frustrated Kenya and hindered its efforts to achieve its objectives. Kenya’s military plan in Somalia has encountered numerous challenges over the years. The Islamist extremist group al-Shabab, known for its links to al-Qaeda, has proven to be a resilient and adaptable adversary. The group has relentlessly attacked military bases and targeted civilians, particularly in border areas, undermining Kenya’s ability to establish a stable buffer zone.
The persistent terrorism threats and casualties on the military have raised concerns among Kenyan citizens and policymakers, sparking a growing debate regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of the operation.
AL-SHABAB’S INCREASING CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS
In recent years, al-Shabab’s cross border attacks have become more frequent and audacious. These attacks not only undermine Kenya’s efforts to establish a secure buffer zone but also raise questions about the effectiveness of Madobe’s leadership in countering the terrorist group.
The latest terrorist attack that struck Kenya’s North Eastern region and Lamu County sent shockwaves through Kenya’s security apparatus and have gained President William Ruto’s attention.
“Al Shabaab is not going to reverse the gains we have made in the last couple of years. We will confront and defeat them.” He said.
ASSAULT ON MANDA BAY EXPOSES VULNERABILITY
The attack on the Manda Bay Base on early 2020, a facility accommodating US personnel, has once again highlighted the susceptibility of Kenya’s security forces in the region. This incident underscores the urgent requirement for a more robust and effective buffer zone strategy, which President Madobe has failed to deliver.
The once rare attacks by al-Shabab on KDF military barracks have evolved into a disturbing pattern of increased frequency and audacity. The militants, emboldened by Jubaland’s idleness and laxity in the face of the growing threats over the years have taken advantage of the porous border between Kenya and Somalia, where they are known to operate from. Their assaults have not only resulted in a rising death toll among Kenyan soldiers but have also caused substantial damage to military infrastructure and civilian death toll.
CHALLENGES IN REGAINING CONTROL OF GEDO
For over four years, President Madobe has encountered significant obstacles in regaining control over the strategic border region of Gedo. Kenya views control of Gedo as vital for its buffer zone plan, yet the region continues to operate independently, beyond the authority of Madobe’s administration.
Experts argue that the prolonged resistance from Gedo’s residents against the regional leader’s attempts to forcefully establish his administration, with the support of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, not only enables the thriving of Al-Shabab but also diverts attention from counter-militant operations.
Given these pressing challenges, Kenyan officials and security experts have started questioning the feasibility of the military intervention and the effectiveness of the buffer zone strategy. Some propose exploring alternative approaches, such as increased regional cooperation and diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of instability in Somalia.
ALTERNATIVE OPTION FOR RE-ENGAGEMENT
As the operation enters its 14th year, there is a growing call for the Ruto-led Government to critically reassess its strategy and consider alternative options that safeguard the country’s security interests while minimizing the strain on its military and resources. One of the recommended strategies is to recalibrate policies by collaborating with Somalia’s Federal institutions and adopting innovative approaches to better protect borders and contribute to regional security.
Regional experts emphasize that collaboration with Mogadishu is of utmost importance. Kenya and Somalia share common security concerns and a unified approach is vital in combating the threat posed by Al-Shabab. They further highlight that strengthening diplomatic ties and engaging in coordinated efforts will not only improve the prospects of establishing a successful buffer zone but also foster regional stability and security.
Critics point out that Madobe’s failure to deliver the necessary plans for creating a buffer zone that protects Kenya’s security interests, contrary to expectations, has put both Nairobi and Mogadishu at a disadvantage, necessitating a reassessment of Kenya’s strategy to address the shortcomings and realign its approach accordingly.
The recent secret arrival of Abdullahi Abdi Jama (Shimbir), the pro-Madobe supposed Gedo Governor in Garbaharey serves as evidence of a genuine partnership between al-Shabab and Madobe, considering his past role as one of the organization’s founders and its first Deputy Leader.
Failure to take these necessary steps will only serve to bolster Al-Shabaab’s strength, particularly as Kenya began withdrawing from its remaining Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Gedo as part of the drawdown process.
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