A new study conducted by Hiraal, a security research institute based in Mogadishu, has shed light on the multitude of difficulties that the Somali government is grappling with in maintaining control over areas that have been recently liberated from the Al-Shabaab (AS) group.
The report highlights pattern of taking and abandoning by the military that has plagued recent efforts by the government to liberate major towns and villages from AS, causing distress among the local population.
For example, the town of Wabxo has changed hands multiple times between August 2014 and November 2022, the report ssys.
In August 2014, Ethiopian forces captured Wabxo town from AS, but AS recaptured it in December 2014 after troops abandoned.
Yet again, the same Ethiopian forces regained control in October 2015, only to abandon it in June 2016. In November 2022, the Somali government captured Wabxo, but AS recaptured it shortly after the government forces withdrew, the report revealed.
Similarly, in April 2017, AS retook the town of El Buur in Galgaduud after Ethiopian troops, who had occupied it for almost three years, abandoned it. Adan Yabal has also experienced multiple changes in control between April and June 2016, with the government taking control on 6 April 2016, only for AS to retake it on 10 April 2016.
The government regained control on 15 May 2016, but AS retook the town on 11 June 2016. Adan Yabal was most recently taken by the government on 06 December 2022.
Moqokori was taken by the government on 22 July 2015, but AS retook it on 15 September 2016.
The government managed to retake Moqokori on 27 December 2016, only for AS to recapture it the following day, on 28 December 2016. Ruunirgood was seized by the government from AS on 30 April 2016, but AS retook it the next day, killing dozens of government soldiers.
The government has since taken Ruunirgood in the latest offensive on 22 December 2022. However, on 25 March 2023, AS overran the Somali National Army (SNA) base in Ruunirgood but withdrew shortly after. SNA forces were redeployed to the town.
The struggles faced by the government in establishing control over these areas can also be attributed to the historical context and clan dynamics of the conflict in Bacaadweyn.
The longstanding rivalry between the Dir and Habar Gidir (HG) clans has played a significant role, with disputes over resources and political power contributing to the tensions. Clan elders have had a crucial role in the region’s politics, and clan dynamics have been a key factor in understanding the conflict.
AS has strategically exploited these clan rivalries and governance issues to expand its influence, focusing on one clan at a time and taking advantage of existing conflicts to establish a foothold in the region.
AS has employed a coercive strategy, including targeted attacks, destruction of local resources, and imposing their presence in the area, to undermine the government’s authority and hinder its efforts to establish security and stability. AS has carried out several attacks, including suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attacks and complex attacks on military bases, as well as targeting civilian infrastructure such as roads and water wells.
Despite the Somali government’s efforts, AS has briefly taken control of Bacaadweyn at various times, such as in January 2021. However, government forces, with the support of local militias and international partners, have been able to repel AS from the town.
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